# 1

#### The only War Power authority is the ability to MAKE MILITARY DECISIONS

Bajesky 13 (2013¶ Mississippi College Law Review¶ 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9¶ LENGTH: 33871 words ARTICLE: Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles' Heel of War Powers NAME: Robert Bejesky\* BIO: \* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.)

A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer's intended for Congress to be the dominant branch in war powers. Congressional war powers include the prerogative to "declare war;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fall short of "war"; "make Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "organize, fund, and maintain the nation's armed forces;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n25) In contrast, the President is endowed with one war power, named as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n26)¶ The Commander-in-Chief authority is a core preclusive power, predominantly designating that the President is the head of the military chain of command when Congress activates the power. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n27) Moreover, peripheral Commander-in-Chief powers are bridled by statutory and treaty restrictions [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n28) because the President "must respect any constitutionally legitimate restraints on the use of force that Congress has enacted." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n29) However, even if Congress has not activated war powers, the President does possess inherent authority to expeditiously and unilaterally react to defend the nation when confronted with imminent peril. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n30) Explicating the intention behind granting the President this latitude, Alexander Hamilton explained that "it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n31) The Framers drew a precise distinction by specifying that the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n32)

**Changing drone control does not RESTRICT LEGAL AUTHORIZATIONS - this evidence is the most specific in the debate about why they are not a restriction!!!!!**

**Ackerman ’13** (Spencer Ackerman, “Little Will Change If the Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes”, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/, March 20, 2013)

Nor does the change to military drone control restrict the relevant legal authorizations in place. The Obama administration relies on an expansive interpretation of a 2001 congressional authorization to run its global targeted-killing program. If that authorization constrains the military to the “hot” battlefield of Afghanistan, someone forgot to tell the Joint Special Operations Command to get out of Yemen.

# 2

#### War powers policy analysis is plagued with flawed scholarship based on constructed threats to US national security – these threats reify the power of the executive while resulting in endless warfare – questioning the underlying assumptions of the knowledge presented in the 1AC is critical to creating a base for substantive political change

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the r elationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The p roblem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

#### Government cyber policy is founded upon an attempt to securitize the Internet that causes endless warfare

Hart 11 (Catherine Hart is a masters student in communications at Simon Fraser University, "Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties", Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop, May 12-15, 2011)

As issues of national security have expanded beyond traditional understandings of the military¶ and warfare, and the invocation of the Global War on Terror has created a climate of constant,¶ low-level threat, the response has been an increase in regulation and surveillance. Agamben¶ explains the effect of this shift on the way in which nations are governed, documenting the¶ gradual emancipation of a ‘state of exception’ from periods of warfare, through the declaration of¶ this state of emergency in times of economic crisis, strikes, and social tensions. The result of this¶ expansion of ‘exceptional circumstances’ has been that “the declaration of the state of exception¶ has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as¶ the normal technique of government” (2005, 14). The state of exception has now become the rule¶ (Benjamin, 2003 392).¶ The framework of national security has therefore been expanded to encompass a wider range of¶ threats, but still invokes pre-existing schemata. As a result, non-military threats have been¶ framed in traditional security terms by politicians for the last several decades, for example the¶ 'war on drugs’, as a means of justifying increasing government regulation and control (Buzan,¶ 2006, 1104) and it is into this framework that cyber security has been added (Nissenbaum, 2005;¶ Nissenbaum & Hansen, 2009; Bendrath, 2003; Bendrath et al, 2007; Saco, 1999). As explained¶ by Myriam Dunn, when addressing cybersecurity, states usually focus on the protection of¶ critical infrastructure, which includes information systems and telecommunications, energy and¶ utilities, transport, and finance (2007, 87). Since being connected to computer networks, these¶ facilities have become vulnerable to attack, as they could be hacked into by outsiders and¶ damaged. At the same time, the Internet “challenges conventional ways of thinking about space,¶ sovereignty, and security” due to its transgression of national borders (Saco, 1999, 262), and¶ such a challenge to state authority through the “blurring of traditional boundaries” has prompted¶ great anxiety from security advisers (ibid, 263). The inability to control the traffic which crosses¶ into U.S. cyberspace, combined with the integration of information systems into all areas of life¶ including critical infrastructure and the military, play into fears about asymmetrical threats. That¶ is to say, with very little risk or investment, a weaker adversary could exploit U.S. information¶ dependence and strike at this weak point while avoiding the nation’s military strength (Dunn,¶ 2007, 93). A concern with this threat is clear throughout cybersecurity policy, as I will show in¶ the analysis of securitization in three key documents from the last three administrations.

#### The mindset of endless threats is a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to the constant creation of more threats

**Lipschutz 1998**

Ronnie, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, “On Security” p. 8

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed  concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.[18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note18#note18) It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.[19](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note19#note19) To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."[20](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note20#note20) But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.[21](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note21#note21) That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective.

#### Security discourse sanitizes global destruction by proliferating symptom-focused solutions to power imbalances—-causes cycles of violence that make global warfare and extinction inevitable—adopt the role of a critical intellectual to question the claims of the 1AC

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#### This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism]. Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to addressthe relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox **IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence**. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87 By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nulliﬁed under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’them– and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conﬂict and militarisation responsible for magniﬁed global insecurity. ‘**Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’** – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, **all in the name of survival** itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response **to an existential danger**.89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system [geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on], phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conﬂicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafﬁcking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring **urgent transformation**, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed [given that state power itself is constituted by these structures] deserve protection. **This justiﬁes the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics**. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. 3.2 From theory to policy Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’. 95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, **this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer**. Instead, **by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity**. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conﬂict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conﬂict are ominous.’ 97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conﬂict.’ 98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conﬂict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’ 99 3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation? Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufﬁcient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of‘othering’in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a speciﬁc socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies [which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures]. This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ [in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms] necessitate conﬂict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to con- ﬂict. The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to [1] fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and [2] translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, **lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection** and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

# 3

#### Chinese can effectively use soft power now, which is uniquely effective- US model fails

**Hölkemeyer 12-6**-13 [Patricia Rodríguez Hölkemeyer, research professor and deputy director of the School of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica, Honorary Member of the Academy Research Center of Central Private, “China's forthcoming soft power as a natural result of international events,” <http://www.china.org.cn/china/Chinese_dream_dialogue/2013-12/06/content_30822607.htm>]

On the other side, Deng'saphorism that China should never strive to attain global hegemony has been widely respected by its leaders and reformers. Nevertheless, today circumstances have changed. China's ancient thinkers rejected the idea of searching for hegemony through stratagems, and favored instead the accomplishment of what Mencius and Xuzi called humane authority. Nevertheless, at the present moment China does not need to strive for the attainment of a leading role because the present world circumstances are catapulting her to become a world superpower. What are the present world circumstances that have put China in the position to have a say in international affairs without having to strive for hegemony? Why is the Western 'presumptive paradigm' (Rodrik)for development failing contrastingly to the pragmatic and experimental learning paradigm of the Chinese reformers that Joshua Cooper Ramo dubbed the Beijing Consensus? The ex-ante presumption of knowledge, a characteristic of the Western countries and global institutions, very probably will be ceding its place to a Deweyian pragmatic change of paradigm, according to which, even the mere conception of what is the best form of democracy is fallible and contextual. ¶ Very probably, the paradigm of 'arrogance' will be giving place to a paradigm based on what the political scientist, Karl Deutsch, once called 'humility'. Deutsch defined its opposite "arrogance" as the posture of permitting oneself the luxury of not to learn (because it is supposed that one has already learned everything), while he defines 'humility' as the attitude of the political leader who is always open to learning from others. The West has forgotten that the concept of feedback (learning form the other) is the biggest bite to the tree of knowledge that humanity has undertaken in the last two thousand years (Bateson). A new concept of democracy has to take into consideration this advancement as the Chinese reform process has done. Western countries' presumptive frame of mind has been slowly losing momentum. The present circumstances provide a clear indication that one of the most cared institutions, the Western multiparty democracy system, has been losing its ability to learn, and thus, its capacity to offer creative solutions to its own and the world's problems. As a former US Ambassador to China said two years ago, the willingness of Chinese leaders to learn from their errors and adapt to new circumstances "differs sharply from what one encounters in Washington, where there's such concern over our inability to correct the problems that are making our political system — in the eyes of many Americans — increasingly dysfunctional."¶ The US has to enhance its learning capacity if it wants to lead in world affairs in cooperation with the newly emerging superpower. The West has to acknowledge that the so called American values are not universal, that harmony implies unity in diversity, that the concept of democracy is fallible and mutable, and that hegemony has to cede to a well gained humane authority, not only abroad but domestically.¶ Since W. W. II, the US attained the soft power that China lacked. Nevertheless, the US insistence in the maintenance of an hegemonic international order applying the smart power (a new concept of Joseph Nye) stratagems, has culminated in the observed failure of the misnamed Arab Spring, even if the application of smart power (instigation through political activism, and the posterior use of military power if necessary) was partially successful in the so called Color Revolutions (Rodríguez-Hölkemeyer, 2013).¶ Given the present circumstances (as the effects of 9/11, the global financial crisis, the formation of the G20, the global rejection of US espionage stratagems, the failure of the Pivot to the East policy due to the attention the US had to devote to the failed Arab Spring, to an ailing Europe, and to its own domestic financial and political problems) China's possibilities to acquire soft power and to exert its positive influence way the international governing institutions and in international relations, are now real. The world needs a new international relations paradigm, other than the Western style democracy promotion policy through political activism (see the book of the present US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad)orchestrated by organized minorities (NGOs) who want to impose the so called 'American values' in countries with different historical paths, culture and aspirations. The new paradigm will have to be founded in ethics, wisdom, cooperation, confidence-building, and on the recognition that knowledge is fallible and hypothetical, and that with globalization world circumstances and interactions are prone to change. This new paradigm has already been successfully tested in the 35 years of China's own economic and institutional reform process and diplomatic practice. This adaptive and learning-prone attitude of the Chinese leaders, even to the point of adapting (not adopting) western suggestions and institutions when necessary, is the underlying cause of the success of the admirable and unique Chinese development path. As Mencius and Xuzi's observations suggest that a country cannot exert international influence if its own house is not in order.¶ In sum, the present article states that now China possesses a substantive experiential wisdom to start a very productive dialogue with the World. Especially in a moment when it is beginning to be clear to many in the World, that to strive for maintaining a hegemonic world order (Mearsheimer) by means of dubious stratagemsis --according to Lao Tzu thought—the kind of response when intentions are going against the natural course of events.

#### US influence trades off with China’s- competing narratives

**Dynon ’13** [Nicholas, PhD candidate at Macquarie University and is coordinator of the Line 21 project, an online resource on Chinese public diplomacy, has served diplomatic postings in Shanghai, Beijing and the Fiji Islands, worked in Australia’s Parliament House as a departmental liaison officer to the Immigration Minister, holds postgraduate degrees from the ANU and the University of Sydney, “Soft Power: A U.S.-China Battleground?” June 19, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/soft-power-a-u-s-china-battleground/>]

Strip away the ostensibly benign surface of public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and language instruction, and it becomes clear that the U.S. and China are engaged in a soft power conflagration – a protracted cultural cold war. On one side bristles incumbent Western values hegemon, the U.S. On the other is China, one of the non-Western civilizations that Samuel Huntington noted back in 1993 “increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”¶ But to shape the world in non-Western ways means engaging in a soft power battlespace against an incumbent who already holds the high ground. Liu comments that in regions deeply influenced by Western cultures, political systems and values, the “latecomer” China is considered a “dissident force." Under such circumstances, “it is rather difficult for China to attract Western countries with its own political and cultural charisma, let alone to replace their positions.”¶ According to this and similar viewpoints, China’s difficulty in projecting soft power across the world is in part due to the way the U.S. leverages its own soft power. Wu Jianmin, the former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University, puts the point well when explaining that U.S. soft power is driven by the imperative of “maintaining US hegemony in changing the world, of letting the world listen to the United States.”¶ Thus, the state of global post-colonial, post-communist ideational hegemony is such that large swathes of the earth’s population see the world through lenses supplied by the West. Through these lenses, perceptions of China are dominated by such concepts as the “China threat theory,” which portrays China as a malevolent superpower upstart.¶ But it’s actually inside China’s borders where the soft power struggle between China and the U.S. is most prominent.¶ Official pronouncements from Chinese leaders have long played up the notion that Western culture is an aggressive threat to China’s own cultural sovereignty. It has thus taken myriad internal measures to ensure the country’s post-Mao reforms remain an exercise in modernization without “westernization.” Since the 1990s, for example, ideological doctrine has been increasingly infused with a new cultural nationalism, and the Party’s previously archaic propaganda system has been massively overhauled and working harder than ever.¶ Especially after the June 4th crackdown and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s leaders under Jiang Zemin began addressing the cultural battlespace with renewed vigor. Resolutions launched in 1996 called for the Party to “carry forward the cream of our traditional culture, prevent and eliminate the spread of cultural garbage, [and] resist the conspiracy by hostile forces to ‘Westernize’ and ‘split’ our country….” Hu Jintao trumpeted the same theme in early 2012 when he warned that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernising and dividing China … Ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.”

#### Chinese soft power restrains aggression- solves regional stability

**Huang ’13** [Chin-Hao Huang, Ph.D. Candidate and a Russell Endowed Fellow in the Political Science and International Relations (POIR) Program at the University of Southern California (USC). Until 2009, he was a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden. He specializes in international security and comparative politics, especially with regard to China and Asia, and he has testified before the Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on Chinese foreign and security policy, “China’s Soft Power in East Asia,” <http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/451/docs/Huang_FINAL_China_Soft_Power_and_Status.pdf>]

China’s authoritarian regime is thus the biggest obstacle to its efforts to construct and project soft ¶ power. At the same time, if the government decides to take a different tack—a more constructive ¶ approach that embraces multilateralism—**Chinese soft power could be a positive force multiplier that contributes to peace and stability in the region**. A widely read and cited article published in ¶ Liaowang, a leading CCP publication on foreign affairs, reveals that there are prospects for China being socialized into a less disruptive power that complies with regional and global norms: ¶ Compared with past practices, China’s diplomacy has indeed displayed a new face. If China’s diplomacy before the 1980s stressed safeguarding of national ¶ security, and its emphasis from the 1980s to early this century is on the creation ¶ of an excellent environment for economic development, then the focus at ¶ present is to take a more active part in international affairs and play the role that a responsible power should on the basis of satisfying the security and ¶ development interests.47 The newly minted leadership in Beijing provides China with an opportunity to reset its soft-power approach and the direction of its foreign policy more generally. If the new leadership pursues a ¶ different course, Washington should seize on this opportunity to craft an effective response to ¶ better manage U.S.-China relations and provide for greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, strengthening regional alliances and existing security and economic architectures could help restrain China’s more bellicose tendencies. At the same time, Washington should be cognizant of the frustrations that are bound to occur in bilateral relations if Beijing continues to define national interest in narrow, self-interested terms. The U.S. should engage more deeply with regional partners to persuade and incentivize China to take on a responsible great-power role commensurate with regional expectations.¶ • The U.S. pivot to the region could be further complemented with an increase in soft-power promotion, including increasing the level of support for Fulbright and other educational exchanges that forge closer professional and interpersonal ties between the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific. Washington should also encourage philanthropy, development assistance, and intellectual engagement by think tanks and civil society organizations that address issues such as public health and facilitate capacity-building projects. China’s rising economic, political, and military power is the most geopolitically significant¶ development of this century. Yet while the breadth of China’s growing power is widely¶ understood, a fulsome understanding of the dynamics of this rise requires a more¶ systematic assessment of the depth of China’s power. Specifically, the strategic, economic,¶ and political implications of China’s soft-power efforts in the region require in-depth analysis.¶ The concept of “soft power” was originally developed by Harvard University professor Joseph Nye¶ to describe the ability of a state to attract and co-opt rather than to coerce, use force, or give money¶ as a means of persuasion.1 The term is now widely used by analysts and statesmen. As originally¶ defined by Nye, soft power involves the ability of an actor to set agendas and attract support on the¶ basis of its values, culture, policies, and institutions. In this sense, he considers soft power to often¶ be beyond the control of the state, and generally includes nonmilitary tools of national power—such¶ as diplomacy and state-led economic development programs—as examples of hard power.¶ Partially due to the obvious pull of China’s economic might, several analysts have broadened Nye’s¶ original definition of soft power to include, as Joshua Kurlantzick observes, “anything outside the¶ military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more¶ coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral¶ organizations.”2 This broader definition of soft power has been exhaustively discussed in China¶ as an element of a nation’s “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli), and some Chinese¶ commentators argue that it is an area where the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may enjoy some¶ advantages vis-à-vis the United States. These strategists advocate spreading appreciation of Chinese¶ culture and values through educational and exchange programs such as the Confucius Institutes.¶ This approach would draw on the attractiveness of China’s developmental model and assistance¶ programs (including economic aid and investment) in order to assuage neighboring countries’¶ concerns about China’s growing hard power.3 China’s soft-power efforts in East Asia—enabled by its active use of coercive economic and social¶ levers such as aid, investment, and public diplomacy—have already accrued numerous benefits for the PRC. Some view the failure of the United States to provide immediate assistance to East and¶ Southeast Asian states during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and China’s widely publicized refusal¶ to devalue its currency at the time (which would have forced other Asian states to follow suit) as a turning point, causing some in Asia to question which great power was more reliable.4 China also uses economic aid, and the withdrawal thereof, as a tool of national power, as seen in China’s considerable aid efforts in Southeast Asia, as well as in its suspension of $200 million in aid to¶ Vietnam in 2006 after Hanoi invited Taiwan to attend that year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation¶ (APEC) summit.5

#### Causes nuclear war- draws in the US

**Eland 12-10**-13 [Ivan Eland,PhD in Public Policy from George Washington University, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, has served as Evaluator-in-Charge for the U.S. General Accounting Office, “Stay Out of Petty Island Disputes in East Asia,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/stay-out-of-petty-island-_b_4414811.html>]

One of the most dangerous international disputes that the United States could get dragged into has little importance to U.S. security -- the disputes nations have over small islands (some really rocks rising out of the sea) in East Asia. Although any war over these islands would rank right up there with the absurd Falkland Islands war of 1982 between Britain and Argentina over remote, windswept sheep pastures near Antarctica, any conflict in East Asia always has the potential to escalate to nuclear war. And unlike the Falklands war, the United States might be right in the atomic crosshairs.¶ Of the two antagonists in the Falklands War, only Britain had nuclear weapons, thus limiting the possibility of nuclear escalation. And although it is true that of the more numerous East Asian contenders, only China has such weapons, the United States has formal alliance commitments to defend three of the countries in competition with China over the islands -- the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea -- and an informal alliance with Taiwan. Unbeknownst to most Americans, those outdated alliances left over from the Cold War implicitly still commit the United States to sacrifice Seattle or Los Angeles to save Manila, Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei, should one of these countries get into a shooting war with China. Though a questionable tradeoff even during the Cold War, it is even less so today. The "security" for America in this implicit pledge has always rested on avoiding a faraway war in the first place using a tenuous nuclear deterrent against China or any other potentially aggressive power. The deterrent is tenuous, because friends and foes alike might wonder what rational set of U.S. leaders would make this ridiculously bad tradeoff if all else failed. ¶ Of course these East Asian nations are not quarreling because the islands or stone outcroppings are intrinsically valuable, but because primarily they, depending on the particular dispute involved, are in waters that have natural riches -- fisheries or oil or gas resources. ¶ In one dispute, the Senkaku or Diaoyu dispute -- depending on whether the Japanese or Chinese are describing it, respectively -- the United States just interjected itself, in response to the Chinese expansion of its air defense zone over the islands, by flying B-52 bombers through this air space to support its ally Japan. The United States is now taking the nonsensical position that it is neutral in the island kerfuffle, even though it took this bold action and pledged to defend Japan if a war ensues. Predictably and understandably, China believes that the United States has chosen sides in the quarrel.¶ Then to match China, South Korea extended its own air defense zone -- so that it now overlaps that of both China and Japan. But that said, as a legacy of World War II, South Korea seems to get along better with China, its largest trading partner, than it does with Japan. Also, South Korea and Japan have a dispute over the Dokdo or Takeshima Islands, depending on who is describing them, in the Sea of Japan. Because the United States has a formal defense alliance with each of those nations and stations forces in both, which would it support if Japan and South Korea went to war over the dispute? It's anyone's guess.

# 4

#### Counterplan: United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations be funded, conducted, and/or directed pursuant to Title 50’s section on presidential approval and reporting of covert actions (a)-(c)(1) and (c)(3)-(f).

#### The counterplan does all of the affirmative EXCEPT making offensive cyber operations subject to Title 50 section 413b(c)(2)- that section refers to the congressional intelligence chairs as chair “men”

Title 50 [United States Code § 413b, FindLaw, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/50/15/III/413b, accessed 2-18-14]

413B: Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions

(a) Presidential findings The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions:

(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the decision is made.

(2) Except as permitted by paragraph (1), a finding may not authorize or sanction a covert action, or any aspect of any such action, which already has occurred.

(3) Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern such participation.

(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element of, or a contractor or contract agent of, the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies and regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned, or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States.

(5) A finding may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States.

(b) Reports to congressional intelligence committees; production of information To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action –

(1) shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including significant failures; and

(2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning covert actions (including the legal basis under which the covert action is being or was conducted) which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government and which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.

(c) Timing of reports; access to finding

(1) The President shall ensure that any finding approved pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be reported in writing to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) and paragraph (3).

(2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may be reported to the **chairmen** and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President.

(3) Whenever a finding is not reported pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this section,(!1) the President shall fully inform the congressional intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.

(4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each congressional intelligence committee.

(5)(A) When access to a finding, or a notification provided under subsection (d)(1), is limited to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2), a written statement of the reasons for limiting such access shall also be provided. (B) Not later than 180 days after a statement of reasons is submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this subparagraph, the President shall ensure that - (i) all members of the congressional intelligence committees are provided access to the finding or notification; or (ii) a statement of reasons that it is essential to continue to limit access to such finding or such notification to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States is submitted to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2).

(d) Changes in previously approved actions

(1) The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(2) of this section, are notified in writing of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

(2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether the activity - (A) involves significant risk of loss of life; (B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; (C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; (D) requires notification under section 414 of this title; (E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or (F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.

(e) "Covert action" defined As used in this subchapter, the term "covert action" means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include –

(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;

(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;

(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or

(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.

(f) Prohibition on covert actions intended to influence United States political processes, etc. No covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media. (g) Notice and general description where access to finding or notification limited; maintenance of records and written statements

(1) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall notify all members of such committee that such finding or such notification has been provided only to the members specified in subsection (c)(2).

(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide to all members of such committee a general description regarding the finding or notification, as applicable, consistent with the reasons for not yet fully informing all members of such committee.

(3) The President shall maintain - (A) a record of the members of Congress to whom a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notification is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each member of Congress receives such finding or notification; and (B) each written statement provided under subsection (c)(5).

#### Terms like chair“man” erase women linguistically and reinforce sexism- must be rejected in every instance

Kleinman, 7 -- UNC Chapel Hill sociology professor

[Sherryl, "Why Sexist Language Matters," Alternet, 3-11-2007, www.alternet.org/story/48856/why\_sexist\_language\_matters, accessed 2-18-14]

Gendered words and phrases like "you guys" may seem small compared to issues like violence against women, but changing our language is an easy way to begin overcoming gender inequality. For years I've been teaching a sociology course at the University of North Carolina on gender inequality. I cover such topics as the wage gap, the "second shift" (of housework and childcare) that heterosexual women often do in the home, the "third shift" (women's responsibility for intimate relationships with men), compulsory heterosexuality, the equation of women's worth with physical attractiveness, the sexualizing of women in the media, lack of reproductive rights for women (especially poor women), sexual harassment and men's violence against women. My course makes links among items on that list. For example, if women are expected to take care of housework and children, then they cannot compete as equals with men in the workplace; if men see women largely as sex objects and servers, then it is hard for men to see women as serious workers outside the home; if women are taught that it is their job to take care of relationships with men, they may be blamed for breakups; if women are economically dependent on men, they may stay with abusive male partners; if women prefer intimacy with women, men may harass or violate them. What I've left off the list is the issue that both women and men in my classes have the most trouble understanding -- or, as I see it, share a strong unwillingness to understand -- sexist language. I'm not referring to such words as "bitch," "whore" and "slut." What I focus on instead are words that students consider just fine: male (so-called) generics. Some of these words refer to persons occupying a position: postman, chairman, freshman, congressman, fireman. Other words refer to the entire universe of human beings: "mankind" or "he." Then we've got manpower, manmade lakes and "Oh, man, where did I leave my keys?" There's "manning" the tables in a country where children learn that "all men are created equal." The most insidious, from my observations, is the popular expression "you guys." Please don't tell me it's a regional term. I've heard it in the Triangle, New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Montreal. I've seen it in print in national magazines, newsletters and books. And even if it were regional, that doesn't make it right. I'll bet we can all think of a lot of practices in our home regions that we'd like to get rid of. I sound defensive. I know. But that's because I've so often heard (and not only from students) ... What's the big deal? Why does all this "man-ning" and "guys-ing" deserve a place in my list of items of gender inequality and justify taking up inches of space in the newsletter of a rape crisis center? Because male-based generics are another indicator -- and more importantly, a reinforcer -- of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Some say that language merely reflects reality and so we should ignore our words and work on changing the unequal gender arrangements that are reflected in our language. Well, yes, in part. It's no accident that "man" is the anchor in our language and "woman" is not. And of course we should make social change all over the place. But the words we use can also reinforce current realities when they are sexist (or racist or heterosexist). Words are tools of thought. We can use words to maintain the status quo or to think in new ways -- which in turn creates the possibility of a new reality. It makes a difference if I think of myself as a "girl" or a "woman"; it makes a difference if we talk about "Negroes" or "African-Americans." Do we want a truly inclusive language or one that just pretends? Before I discuss how benign-sounding words like "freshman" and "you guys" reinforce the gender inequalities on my list, above, let me tell you about an article that made a difference in my own understanding of sexist language. In 1986 Douglas Hofstadter, a philosopher, wrote a parody of sexist language by making an analogy with race. His article ("A Person Paper on Purity in Language") creates an imaginary world in which generics are based on race rather than gender. In that world, people would use "fresh white," "chair white" and yes, "you whiteys." People of color would hear "all whites are created equal" -- and be expected to feel included. Substituting "white" for "man" makes it easy to see why using "man" for all human beings is wrong. Yet, women are expected to feel flattered by "freshman," "chairman" and "you guys." And can you think of one, just one, example of a female-based generic? Try using "freshwoman" with a group of male students or calling your male boss "chairwoman." Then again, don't. There could be serious consequences for referring to a man as a "woman" -- a term that still means "lesser" in our society. If not, why do men get so upset at the idea of being called women? And why do so many women cling to "freshman," "chairman" and "you guys?" I think I know why, though it doesn't make me feel any better. "Man" is a high-status term, and women want to be included in the "better" group. But while being labeled "one of the guys" might make us feel included, it's only a guise of inclusion, not the reality. If we were really included, we wouldn't have to disappear into the word "guys." I'm not saying that people who use "you guys" have bad intentions, but think of the consequences. All those "man" words -- said many times a day by millions of people every day -- cumulatively reinforce the message that men are the standard and that women should be subsumed by the male category. We know from history that making a group invisible makes it easier for the powerful to do what they want with members of that group. And we know, from too many past and current studies, that far too many men are doing "what they want" with women. Most of us can see a link between calling women "sluts" and "whores" and men's sexual violence against women. We need to recognize that making women linguistically a subset of man/men through terms like "mankind" and "guys" also makes women into objects. If we, as women, aren't worthy of such true generics as "first-year," "chair" or "you all," then how can we expect to be paid a "man's wage," be respected as people rather than objects (sexual or otherwise) on the job and at home, be treated as equals rather than servers or caretakers of others, be considered responsible enough to make our own decisions about reproduction, define who and what we want as sexual beings? If we aren't even deserving of our place in humanity in language, why should we expect to be treated as decent human beings otherwise? Now and then someone tells me that I should work on more important issues -- like men's violence against women -- rather than on "trivial" issues like language. Well, I work on lots of issues. But that's not the point. What I want to say (and do say, if I think they'll give me the time to explain) is that working against sexist language is working against men's violence against women. It's one step. If we cringe at "freshwhite" and "you whiteys" and would protest such terms with loud voices, then why don't we work as hard at changing "freshman" and "you guys?" Don't women deserve it? If women primarily exist in language as "girls" (children), "sluts" and "guys," it does not surprise me that we still have a long list of gendered inequalities to fix. We've got to work on every item on the list. Language is one we can work on right now, if we're willing. It's easier to start saying "you all" instead of "you guys" than to change the wage gap tomorrow. Nonsexist English is a resource we have at the tip of our tongues. Let's start tasting this freedom now. I hope that you'll check the website about sexist language: www.youall2.freeservers.com. You'll find there an educational tool -- a business-sized card about the problems with "you guys" -- that you can download on a computer and leave at restaurants and other public places where the term is used. You can also leave it with friends and begin a conversation about all the reasons why sexist language matters.

# Case

#### Cyber threats are non-existent, multiple warrants prove, takes out all internal links to 1AC discount it as a whole

Cavelty 12 (Myriam Dunn Cavelty is a faculty member of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Center for Security Studies, "The militarisation of cyber security as a source of global tension", http://www.academia.edu/1471717/The\_militarisation\_of\_cyber\_security\_as\_a\_source\_of\_global\_tension, Strategic Trends 2012)

There is no denying that different political,¶ economic, and military conflicts¶ have had cyber(ed) components¶ for a number of years now. Furthermore,¶ criminal and espionage activities¶ involving the use of computers happen¶ every day. It is a fact that cyber¶ incidents are continually causing¶ minor and only occasionally major¶ inconveniences: These may be in the¶ form of lost intellectual property or¶ other proprietary data, maintenance¶ and repair, lost revenue, and increased¶ security costs. Beyond the direct impact,¶ badly handled cyber attacks have¶ also damaged corporate (and government)¶ reputations and have, theoretically¶ at least, the potential to reduce¶ public confidence in the security of¶ Internet transactions and e-commerce¶ if they become more frequent.¶ However, in the entire history of¶ computer networks, there are no examples¶ of cyber attacks that resulted¶ in actual physical violence against¶ persons (nobody has ever died from¶ a cyber incident), and only very few¶ had a substantial effect on property¶ (Stuxnet being the most prominent).¶ So far, cyber attacks have not caused¶ serious long-term disruptions. They¶ are risks that can be dealt with by¶ individual entities using standard¶ information security measures, and¶ their overall costs remain low in comparison¶ to other risk categories such¶ as financial risks.¶ These facts tend to be almost completely¶ disregarded in policy circles.¶ There are several reasons why the¶ threat is overrated. First, as combating¶ cyber threats has become a highly¶ politicised issue, official statements¶ about the level of threat must also be¶ seen in the context of competition for¶ resources and influence between various¶ bureaucratic entities. This is usually¶ done by stating an urgent need¶ for action and describing the overall¶ threat as big and rising.¶ Second, psychological research has¶ shown that risk perception, including¶ the perception of experts, is highly¶ dependent on intuition and emotions.¶ Cyber risks, especially in their¶ more extreme form, fit the risk profile¶ of so-called ‘dread risks’, which are¶ perceived as catastrophic, fatal, unknown,¶ and basically uncontrollable.¶ There is a propensity to be disproportionally¶ afraid of these risks despite¶ their low probability, which translates¶ into pressure for regulatory action of¶ all sorts and the willingness to bear¶ high costs of uncertain benefit.¶ Third, the media distorts the threat¶ perception even further. There is no¶ hard data for the assumption that the¶ level of cyber risks is actually rising¶ – beyond the perception of impact¶ and fear. Some IT security companies¶ have recently warned against overemphasising¶ sophisticated attacks just¶ because we hear more about them.¶ In 2010, only about 3 per cent of all¶ incidents were considered so sophisticated¶ that they were impossible to¶ stop. The vast majority of attackers¶ go after low-hanging fruit, which are¶ small to medium sized enterprises¶ with bad defences. These types of¶ incidents tend to remain under the¶ radar of the media and even law enforcement.¶ Cyber war remains unlikely¶ Since the potentially devastating¶ effects of cyber attacks are so scary, the¶ temptation is very high not only to¶ think about worst-case scenarios, but¶ also to give them a lot of (often too¶ much) weight despite their very low¶ probability. However, most experts¶ agree that strategic cyber war remains¶ highly unlikely in the foreseeable¶ future, mainly due to the uncertain¶ results such a war would bring, the¶ lack of motivation on the part of the¶ possible combatants, and their shared¶ inability to defend against counterattacks.¶ Indeed, it is hard to see how¶ cyber attacks could ever become truly¶ effective for military purposes: It is¶ exceptionally difficult to take down¶ multiple, specific targets and keep¶ them down over time. The key difficulty¶ is proper reconnaissance and¶ targeting, as well as the need to deal¶ with a variety of diverse systems and¶ be ready for countermoves from your¶ adversary. ¶ Furthermore, nobody can be truly¶ interested in allowing the unfettered¶ proliferation and use of cyber war¶ tools, least of all the countries with¶ the offensive lead in this domain.¶ Quite to the contrary, strong arguments¶ can be made that the world’s¶ big powers have an overall strategic¶ interest in developing and accepting¶ internationally agreed norms on¶ cyber war, and in creating agreements¶ that might pertain to the¶ development, distribution, and deployment¶ of cyber weapons or to¶ their use (though the effectiveness of¶ such norms must remain doubtful).¶ The most obvious reason is that the¶ countries that are currently openly¶ discussing the use of cyber war tools¶ are precisely the ones that are the¶ most vulnerable to cyber warfare attacks¶ due to their high dependency¶ on information infrastructure. The¶ features of the emerging information¶ environment make it extremely¶ unlikely that any but the most limited¶ and tactically oriented instances¶ of computer attacks could be contained.¶ More likely, computer attacks¶ could ‘blow back’ through the¶ interdependencies that are such an¶ essential feature of the environment.¶ Even relatively harmless viruses and¶ worms would cause considerable¶ random disruption to businesses,¶ governments, and consumers. This¶ risk would most likely weigh much¶ heavier than the uncertain benefits to¶ be gained from cyber war activities.¶ Certainly, thinking about (and planning¶ for) worst-case scenarios is a¶ legitimate task of the national security¶ apparatus. Also, it seems almost¶ inevitable that until cyber war is¶ proven to be ineffective¶ or forbidden, states and¶ non-state actors who¶ have the ability to develop¶ cyber weapons will try to do¶ so, because they appear cost-effective,¶ more stealthy, and less risky than other¶ forms of armed conflict. However,¶ cyber war should not receive too much¶ attention at the expense of more plausible¶ and possible cyber problems.¶ Using too many resources for highimpact,¶ low-probability events – and¶ therefore having less resources for the¶ low to middle impact and high probability¶ events – does not make sense,¶ neither politically, nor strategically¶ and certainly not when applying a¶ cost-benefit logic.¶ Europe is not the US¶ The cyber security discourse is American¶ in origin and American in the¶ making: At all times, the US government¶ shaped both the threat perception¶ and the envisaged countermeasures.¶ Interestingly enough, there are¶ almost no variations to be found in¶ other countries’ cyber threat discussions¶ – even though the strategic¶ contexts differ fundamentally. Many¶ of the assumptions at the heart of¶ the cyber security debate are shaped¶ by the fears of a military and political¶ superpower. The US eyes the cyber¶ capabilities of its traditional rivals, the¶ rising power of China and the declining¶ power of Russia, with particular¶ suspicion. This follows¶ a conventional strategic¶ logic: The main¶ question is whether¶ the cyber dimension could suddenly¶ tip the scales of power against the US¶ or have a negative effect on its ability¶ to project power anywhere and anytime.¶ In addition, due to its exposure¶ in world politics and its military engagements,¶ the US is a prime target¶ for asymmetric attack.¶ The surely correct assumption that¶ modern societies and their armed forces¶ depend on the smooth functioning¶ of information and communication¶ technology does not automatically¶ mean that this dependence will be¶ exploited – particularly not for the majority¶ of states in Europe. The existence¶ of the cyber realm seems to lead people¶ to assume that because they have¶ vulnerabilities, they will be exploited.¶ But in security and defence matters,¶ careful threat assessments need to be¶ made. Such assessments require that¶ the following question be carefully¶ deliberated: ‘Who has an interest in¶ attacking us and the capability to do so,¶ and why would they?’ For many democratic¶ states, particularly in Europe, the¶ risk of outright war has moved far to¶ the background and the tasks of their¶ armies have been adapted to this. Fears¶ of asymmetric attacks also rank low.¶ The same logic applies to the cyber domain.¶ The risk of a warlike cyber attack¶ of severe proportions is minimal; there¶ is no plausible scenario for it. Cyber¶ crime and cyber espionage, both political¶ and economic, are a different story:¶ They are here now and will remain the¶ biggest cyber risks in the future.¶ The limits of analogies¶ Even if the cyber threat were to be¶ considered very high, the current¶ trend conjures up wrong images.¶ Analogies are very useful for relating¶ non-familiar concepts or complex ideas¶ with more simple and familiar ones.¶ But when taken too far, or even taken¶ for real, they begin to have detrimental¶ effects. Military terms like ‘cyber¶ weapons’, ‘cyber capabilities’, ‘cyber¶ offence’, ‘cyber defence’, and ‘cyber¶ deterrence’ suggest that cyberspace¶ can and should be handled as an operational¶ domain of warfare like land,¶ sea, air, and outer space (cyberspace¶ has in fact been officially recognised¶ as a new domain in US military doctrine).¶ Again, this assumption clashes¶ with the reality of the threat and the¶ possibilities for countermeasures.¶ First, calling offensive measures cyber¶ weapons does not change the fact that¶ hacker tools are not really like physical¶ weapons. They are opportunistic and¶ aimed at outsmarting the technical¶ defences. As a result, their effect is usually¶ not controllable in a military sense¶ – they might deliver something useful¶ or they might not. Also, even though¶ code can be copied, the knowledge¶ and preparation behind it cannot be¶ easily proliferated. Each new weapon¶ needs to be tailored to the system it¶ is supposed to attack. Cyber weapons¶ cannot be kept in a ‘silo’ for a long¶ time, because at any time, the vulnerability¶ in the system that it is targeted¶ at could be patched and the weapon¶ would be rendered useless.¶ Second, thinking in terms of attacks¶ and defence creates a wrong image of¶ immediacy of cause and effect. However,¶ high-level cyber attacks against¶ infrastructure targets will likely be¶ the culmination of long-term, subtle,¶ systematic intrusions. The preparatory¶ phase could take place over several¶ years. When – or rather if – an¶ intrusion is detected, it is often impossible¶ to determine whether it was¶ an act of vandalism, computer crime,¶ terrorism, foreign intelligence activity,¶ or some form of strategic military¶ attack. The only way to determine¶ the source, nature, and scope of the¶ incident is to investigate it. This again¶ might take years, with highly uncertain¶ results. The military notion of¶ striking back is therefore useless in¶ most cases.¶ Third, deterrence works if one party¶ is able to successfully convey to an-¶ other that it is both capable and¶ willing to use a set of available (often¶ military) instruments against the¶ other side if the latter steps over the¶ line. This requires an opponent that¶ is clearly identifiable as an attacker¶ and has to fear retaliation – which¶ is not the case in cyber security because¶ of the attribution problem.¶ Attribution of blame on the basis¶ of the cui bono logic is not sufficient¶ proof for political action.¶ Therefore, deterrence and retribution¶ do not work in cyberspace and¶ will not, unless its rules are changed¶ in substantial ways, with highly¶ uncertain benefits. Much of what is¶ said in China and in the US about¶ their own and the other’s cyber¶ capabilities is (old) deterrence rhetoric¶ – and must be understood as such.¶ The White House’s new International¶ Strategy for Cyberspace of 2011¶ states that the US reserves the right to¶ retaliate to hostile acts in cyberspace¶ with military force. This ‘hack us and¶ we might bomb you’ statement is an¶ old-fashioned declaratory policy that¶ preserves the option of asymmetrical¶ response as a means of deterrence,¶ even though both sides actually know¶ that following up on it is next to¶ impossible.¶ Fourth, cyberspace is only in parts¶ controlled or controllable by state¶ actors. At least in the case of democracies,¶ power in this domain is in the¶ hands of private actors, especially the¶ business sector. Much of the expertise¶ and many of the resources required¶ for taking better protective measures¶ are located outside governments. The¶ military – or any other state entity for¶ that matter – does not own critical (information)¶ infrastructures and has no¶ direct access to them. Protecting them¶ as a military mandate is impossible,¶ and conceiving of cyberspace as an¶ occupation zone is an illusion. Militaries¶ cannot defend the cyberspace of¶ their country – it is not a space where¶ troops and tanks can be deployed, because¶ the logic of national boundaries¶ does not apply.¶ The role of the military in¶ cyber security¶ Future conflicts between nations¶ will most certainly have a cyberspace¶ component, but this will just be an¶ accompanying element of the battle.¶ Regardless of how high we judge¶ the risk of a large-scale cyber attack,¶ military-type countermeasures will¶ not be able to play a substantial role¶ in cyber security because of the nature¶ of the attacker and the nature of the¶ attacked. Investing too much time¶ talking about them or spending increasing¶ amounts of money on them¶ will not make cyberspace more secure¶ – quite the contrary. These findings¶ are not particularly new: Most experts¶ had come to the same conclusion in¶ the late 1990s, when the debate was¶ not yet as securitised. At the time, the¶ issue was discussed under the heading¶ of critical infrastructure protection¶ rather than cyber security, but¶ the basic premises were the same. The¶ role for the military as conceptualised¶ then hardly differs from the role the¶ military should take on today.¶ Undoubtedly, attacks on information¶ technology, manipulation of information,¶ or espionage can have serious¶ effects on the present and/or future¶ of defensive or offensive effectiveness¶ of one’s own armed forces. First and¶ foremost, militaries should therefore¶ focus on the protection and resilience¶ of their information infrastructure and¶ networks, particularly the critical parts¶ of it, at all times. All the successful attacks¶ on military and military-affiliated¶ networks over the last few years are less¶ a sign of impending cyber-doom than a¶ sign of low information security prowess¶ in the military. In case the unfortunate¶ label ‘cyber defence’ should stick,¶ it will be crucial to make sure that everybody¶ – including top-level decisionmakers¶ – understand that cyber defence¶ is not much more than a fancy word for¶ standard information assurance and risk¶ management practices. Furthermore,¶ information assurance is not provided¶ by obscure ‘cyber commands’, but by¶ computer security specialists, whether¶ they wear uniforms or not.¶ The cyber dimension is also relevant in¶ military operations insofar as an adversary’s¶ critical infrastructure is deemed¶ to be a major centre of gravity, i.e.,¶ a source of strength and power that¶ needs to be weakened in order to prevail.¶ However, intelligence-gathering¶ by means of cyber espionage must¶ be treated with utmost care: In an atmosphere¶ fraught with tension, such¶ activities, even if or especially because¶ they are non-attributable, will be read¶ as signs of aggression and will add¶ further twists to the spiral of insecurity,¶ with detrimental effects for everybody.¶ The implication of this is that¶ military staff involved in operative¶ and military strategic planning and¶ the intelligence community will have¶ to be aware of cyber issues too. However,¶ in the future, decisive strikes¶ against critical (information) infrastructure¶ will most likely still consist¶ of kinetic attacks or traditional forms¶ of sabotage rather than the intrusion¶ of computer systems.¶ As for the things the military should¶ not do when it comes to the realm of¶ cyberspace, two major points come¶ to mind. First, particularly as long as¶ the ability to withstand cyber intrusions¶ of military networks or civilian¶ networks remains low, it is unwise to¶ declare the development or possession¶ of offensive measures. It does not have¶ a credible deterring effect, the actual¶ use would bring unclear benefits and¶ high risks, and again, it adds to the¶ cyber security dilemma.¶ Second, the military cannot take¶ on a substantial role in ensuring the¶ cyber security of a whole country.¶ Due to privatisation and deregulation¶ of many parts of the public sector in¶ most of the developed world, between¶ 85 and 95 per cent of the critical¶ infrastructure are owned and operated¶ by the private sector. Given that overly¶ intrusive market interventions are not¶ deemed a valid option, states have but¶ one option: to try to get the private¶ sector to help in the task of protecting¶ these assets. What emerged from¶ this in the late 1990s already was a¶ focus on critical infrastructure protection,¶ with one particularly strong¶ pillar: public-private partnerships. A¶ large number of them were (and still¶ are) geared towards facilitating information¶ exchange between companies¶ themselves, but also between companies¶ and government entities, which¶ are usually not part of the military¶ or intelligence establishment. This is¶ complemented by measures taken to¶ ensure that the damage potential of a¶ successful attack is constantly decreasing,¶ for example by augmenting the¶ resilience of information networks¶ and critical infrastructures.¶ In conclusion, governments and military¶ actors should acknowledge that¶ their role in cyber security can only¶ be a limited one, even if they consider¶ cyber threats to be a major national¶ security threat. Cyber security is and¶ will remain a shared responsibility between¶ public and private actors. Governments¶ should maintain their role¶ in protecting critical infrastructure¶ where necessary while determining¶ how best to encourage market forces¶ to improve the security and resilience¶ of company-owned networks. Threatrepresentation¶ must remain well¶ informed and well balanced in order¶ to prevent overreactions. Despite the¶ increasing attention cyber security is¶ getting in security politics, computer¶ network vulnerabilities are mainly a¶ business and espionage problem. Further¶ militarising cyberspace based on¶ the fear of other states’ cyber capabilities¶ or trying to solve the attribution¶ problem will have detrimental effects¶ on the way humankind uses the¶ Internet; and the overall cost of these¶ measures will most likely outweigh¶ the benefits. What is most needed¶ in the current debate is a move away¶ from fear-based doomsday thinking¶ and a move towards more level-headed¶ threat assessments that take into¶ account the strategic context.

# 2NC/1NR

Harris, Grainger and Mullany ‘6[Sandra (Professor Emeritus at Nottingham Trent University); Karen (Lecturer in Communications at Sheffield Hallam College); Louise (Professor Linguistics at University of Nottingham); “The pragmatics of political apologies”; Discourse Society 17 //nick]

In reply to an audience member who responded to this statement by Patricia Hewitt by shouting ‘You haven’t’, and the prolonged applause for another woman who argued that Mr Blair’s conference ‘apology’ really meant ‘That is saying I’m able to apologize but I’m not actually apologising’, Ms Hewitt made the following statement to the Question Time audience: I certainly want to say that all of us, from the Prime Minister down, all of us who were involved in making an incredibly difficult decision are very sorry and do apologize for the fact that that information was wrong – but I don’t think we were wrong to go in. It was primarily these words which sparked off the very considerable public debate and controversy which followed. Major newspapers headlined Ms Hewitt’s ‘apology’ the next day; a member of the Government appeared on the Radio 4 early morning Today programme; clips from Question Time appeared on the news the next evening; BBC News invited its listeners worldwide to respond by expressing their views as to whether ‘Patricia Hewitt was right to apologise’ online; Michael Howard (the then Leader of the Opposition) further demanded an apology from the Prime Minister in Parliament the following week in Prime Minister’s Question Time (13 October 2004). At a time when it had become increasingly clear that Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction and the Prime Minister’s decision to go to war in Iraq was being undermined by arguments not so much concerning the validity of intelligence reports but as to how they were interpreted and used by the Government, it is interesting that the controversy should centre not only on the increasing demand for a political apology but on the substance and nature of that apology. If we look at what Ms Hewitt actually said, she uses both of the explicit Ifid words, i.e. ‘sorry’ (intensified) and ‘apologise’. She emphasizes by way of explanation that the decision to go to war was an ‘incredibly difficult’ one and that ‘the [intelligence] information was wrong’. Moreover, she also in her statement assumes some kind of collective responsibility; her ‘apology’ is on behalf not only of the Prime Minister but of ‘all of us’ who were involved. Thus, on the surface, this looks very like an apology, and, indeed, it was widely reported in the media as the ‘first direct apology to be made by a senior member of the Government’. It is interesting to note how The Daily Telegraph (9/10/04: 10), for example, defines such a speech act. ‘Miss Hewitt issued her direct apology, using the word “sorry”’, contrasting this usage with Mr Blair and other ministers, who have ‘studiously avoided using the word “sorry” in this context’. Downing Street, on the other hand, claimed that Ms Hewitt was not saying anything that Mr Blair had not said already, i.e. ‘All she was doing was echoing precisely what the Prime Minster had said, which is, of course, that we regret the fact that some information was wrong’ (cited in The Daily Telegraph, 9/10/04). In a sense, Downing Street is right. In terms of the taxonomy of the strategies which constitute an apology as an identifiable speech act, Ms Hewitt has used both the explicit Ifid words, but her collective responsibility is a spurious one, since it relates to an ‘offence’ committed (implicitly) by the intelligence services (producing wrong information) rather than the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister. Hence, the Ifid ‘sorry’ becomes necessarily ‘sorry’ as regret, as the Downing Street statement which followed Hewitt’s ‘apology’ makes explicit. Because ‘sorry’ as regret carries no acceptance of responsibility or accountability, the ‘offence’ becomes an implicit part of the explanation, even a justification for an ‘incredibly difficult decision’. Reparation, forbearance, absolution are not appropriate in such circumstances. Moreover, Ms Hewitt concludes her ‘apology’ with a statement (‘but I don’t think we were wrong to go in’) which contradicts the demand made by the questioner, i.e. that the Prime Minister should apologize for taking the British nation to war in Iraq. However, though nearly all forms of media who report the Question Time encounter refer to Hewitt’s statement as an ‘apology’, thus at least implicitly categorizing it as such, most of them do call into question in various ways its nature and substance. The many viewers who responded to BBC News are even more critical and also, perhaps surprisingly, more discerning, despite the fact that the invitation was headlined: ‘Ms Hewitt is the first senior member of the government to make a direct apology for the intelligence failings’ and the question worded as ‘Was Patricia Hewitt right to apologise? Does the apology draw a line under the debate over WMD?’, all of which accept as a presupposition that an apology has been made. The most frequent question raised by both the press and viewers has to do with accountability, i.e. that a ‘proper’ apology involves the acceptance of personal responsibility for the ‘offence’ by the apologizer. Hence, Patricia Hewitt’s apology is faulty both because she’s apologizing for something for which she bears no responsibility (‘What does Patricia Hewitt have to do with the security services?’, as one viewer asks) and for the ‘wrong’ offence, i.e. that it was the Prime Minister’s misrepresentation of the intelligence reports, not the intelligence reports in themselves, which was wrong (‘I asked him [the Prime Minister] very specifically about the way in which he misrepresented the intelligence that he received to the country. Why can he not bring himself to say sorry for that?’ – Michael Howard in the House of Commons, 13 October 2004). Both the press and large numbers of viewers, like Michael Howard, question the acceptability of Hewitt’s remarks on these grounds. Perhaps partly because Hewitt’s ‘apology’ comes to exemplify what is seen as the failure of a number of leading politicians to accept accountability, viewers, like the press, also question the ultimate significance of political apologies which appear to be unconnected with meaningful action, both in terms of rectifying the damage caused by the ‘offence’ (‘An apology won’t bring back the lives of the servicemen lost, nor the civilians, nor rectify the damage, nor pay back the £5bn cost, nor call off the insurgents and terrorists, nor free Ken Bigley’ – BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04) and as an indication of the (lack of) seriousness of the politician’s sense of remorse (‘The only apology that I would accept is the apology of resignation’ – BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04). Examining the controversy which followed Ms Hewitt’s Question Time statement has highlighted the complexity of political apologies in relationship to the interpersonal types usually explored in the apology literature – or at least has demonstrated that different types of complexity are involved. First of all, it is clear that the use of one of the two explicit Ifids (‘sorry’ and ‘apologize’) appear to be crucial according to the judgements/evaluations of both the press and viewers in order to categorize what a politician says as an apology. The widespread categorization of Patricia Hewitt’s statement by the press as ‘the first direct apology by a senior minister’ appears to relate to her use of these Ifids. Tony Blair’s conference statement, on the other hand (‘I can apologize for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I can’t, sincerely at least, apologize for removing Saddam’) is ambiguous in its use of ‘can’ as to whether that speech act is actually being performed, and the clear emphasis is, in any case, on his refusal to apologize for the act cited in the latter half of the sentence. Indirection in a political apology is likely to be perceived negatively as evasion and shiftiness. Second, there are clearly disputes over who should apologize; hence, the reaction of much of the press and many viewers who write in online that Patricia Hewitt is not the appropriate person to apologize for something for which she had minimal or no responsibility. There is also the question of the ‘offence’ itself, which in the Question Time challenge by the studio audience is related to the decision to go to war in Iraq, but in the apology becomes that the information provided by the intelligence services was wrong. And, perhaps most significant, to whom is the apology being made? Who are the victim/s? Unlike Mr Blair’s apology for the ‘injustice’ to those wrongly convicted for the IRA pub bombings, where the victims are named, there are no victims indicated in Ms Hewitt’s apology. The implication in the studio audience challenge is that it is the British people to whom an apology for the decision to go to war in Iraq should be addressed, for having been misled, but the implications are probably even wider than that. (If there is an implicit meaning in the apology statement itself, it is that the Government itself has been ‘victimized’ by having been provided with faulty intelligence, especially since Ms Hewitt clearly states that the act of going to war itself was ‘not wrong’.) In addition, Ms Hewitt’s statement is made in the immediate context in answer to a question raised by a member of the studio audience, but the reaction of that audience certainly demonstrates that they regard the ‘apology’ as directed at the entire audience rather than at the specific individual. Ms Hewitt knew that her statement was also being heard by the unseen wider audience who are watching the programme and must have anticipated that it would be taken up by the press, repeated and published for a wider public yet. Who the ‘victim/s’ are and the nature of the ‘offence’ are clearly disputed territory which the ‘apology’ does little to clarify. Clearly, the political stakes for the Prime Minister are incredibly high, and whatever his current beliefs about Iraq or the demands of a substantial number of the British public for an apology for taking the country to war on the basis of faulty (or misrepresented) intelligence, Tony Blair is unlikely ever to issue a political apology which would satisfy the basic conditions of those demands according to viewer judgements (an Ifid token + an expression which indicates acceptance of responsibility and/or blame for wrongdoing) – or to resign (absolution).1 Conclusions We would agree with Luke (1997) that ‘the apology has become a form of political speech with increasing significance and power’ (p. 344), and across the political spectrum on a global scale has, arguably, become one of the most prominent of ‘public’ speech acts. Even though it may not as yet be ‘the age of the apology’, the relative lack of interest in the political apology as a generic type of discourse by sociolinguistics and pragmatics is both surprising and unwarranted, since they demonstrate some revealing differences as well as significant areas of overlap with the type of interpersonal and individual apologies which have been the primary focus of the now considerable amount of apology research. For example, much of the existing literature on apologies, following Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), adopts a face-needs perspective, seeing the apology as basically a negative politeness strategy which is aimed mainly at the redress of Face Threatening Acts (see Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987; Goffman, 1971; Holmes, 1995, 1998). It is certainly the case that many types of political apologies do represent a potentially serious loss of face for politicians, which may be why they are frequently so eager to apologize for things for which they cannot be held accountable. But to approach political apologies by means of face-oriented definitions is often not particularly helpful and highlights some of the important differences with the interpersonal data on which such definitions are most often based. Holmes (1998), for instance, defines apologies as follows: An apology is a speech act addressed to B’s face-needs and intended to remedy an offense for which A takes responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B (where A is the apologizer, and B is the person offended). (p. 204) Clearly, this is a definition which assumes that it is two individuals who are involved in the process of apologizing and that addressing the face-needs of the ‘person offended’ is the primary motive for the speech act, with the restoring of equilibrium its main goal. Such definitions do not take us very far in understanding the significance and issues raised by political apologies. Given the magnitude of some of the ‘offences’ we have considered, describing what the apology addresses as the ‘face-needs’ of ‘the person offended’ seems neither accurate nor enlightening. To claim that it is the face-needs of Samantha Roberts which are in some way damaged or that she is ‘the person offended’ seems somehow to trivialize events which are of a very serious nature. Nor would these terms be very helpful in describing the motives held by the various persons and groups who call on the British Prime Minister to apologize for taking the country to war in Iraq – or for allegedly misrepresenting the intelligence reports to members of Parliament. Moreover, the process of restoring ‘equilibrium’ is again likely to be a much more complex process – if it can be achieved at all – than is the case when apologies are negotiated between individuals acting in a private capacity. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine how Robinson’s (2004) notion of a ‘preferred’ response (one which offers absolution to the apologizer rather than merely accepting the apology) could possibly be applicable in the case of most political apologies. Even in the instance of fairly low level ‘offences’ such as the British diplomat who described Nottingham as a more dangerous place than Saudi Arabia, city officials agreed to accept the apology rather than to offer absolution to the ‘offender’. However, Holmes’ emphasis on the apologizer’s accepting responsibility for the offence and Robinson’s argument that ‘Apologizing is an essential component of the maintenance of social harmony because it communicates awareness and acceptance of moral responsibility for offensive behavior’ (2004: 292) both foreground the essential sense of morality which generates the need for such apologies and which goes well beyond face-needs. What Samantha Roberts demands is an apology from the Minister for Defence which explicitly accepts his own moral responsibility for the actions which led to her husband’s death. From both the press and viewers, Ms Hewitt’s political apology produces responses which are concerned essentially with morality, i.e. what is right or wrong, what the politician/s should or should not do; and these responses most often centre on the question of accepting personal responsibility. Eelen (2001: 249) argues in conjunction with new directions in politeness theory that ‘morality is no longer regarded as a fixed higher-order set of rules that determine the individual’s behaviour, but as something that people do to – or with – each other’. This seems to us an arguable point but one which is overstated. Though what constitutes an acceptable political apology may not be based on ‘a fixed higher-order set of rules’, there does seem to exist a cultural consensus that is morally grounded and goes beyond the merely individual response, i.e. it is right for a politician to offer an apology in which s/he explicitly accepts responsibility for his/her own acts and wrong to attempt to evade that responsibility. This is not to deny that the political apology is a contested concept or that it not only arises out of discourse struggle but generates further struggle and controversy. It is that very discourse struggle which is, indeed, part of their interest for linguists and which is reflected in the substantial amount of media coverage and public debate that political apologies often provoke. However, once again, we would argue that apologies, nearly always regarded in apology research as a ‘quintessential’ politeness strategy, are more than ‘an argumentative social tool with which the individual can accomplish things’ (Eelen, 2001: 249) and also that political apologies are perceived as more than a politeness strategy. It is interesting that the British data on political apologies which we have examined contains no references at all to the question of (im)politeness, though that too frequently evokes impassioned public debate. Like Eelen, Mills (2003) also regards apologies as a contested concept and stresses the importance of ‘evaluation’. ‘Apologies are often composed of elements which cannot be recognised easily by either interactants or analysts as unequivocal apologies’ (p. 111). Hence, ‘apologies cannot be considered to be a formal linguistic entity (p. 222) but rather ‘a judgement made about someone’s linguistic performance’ (p. 112). This, again, is probably true in a general sense, and as we maintained earlier, apologies are unlikely ever to be defined precisely as a fixed set of semantic components. However, once again, though the evaluative component is highly significant, the responses (from both media and public) to the political apologies in our data are more than merely individuals making disparate judgements about ‘someone’s linguistic performance’. They do instead, we would argue, reflect a set of cultural expectations as to what constitutes a valid apology as a formal speech act, and, as such, contain also a quite considerable degree of predictability. Indeed, it is in large measure the fact that listeners and viewers do have a sense of what constitutes an ‘unequivocal apology’ that perpetuates the discourse struggle. In contrast to many apologies between individuals, which may take a wide variety of forms and often contain a high degree of implicitness, it seems to be crucial if political apologies are to be regarded as valid by those to whom they are addressed that they are not implicit or ambiguous, i.e. that they contain an explicit Ifid (‘sorry’ and/or ‘apologize’) and that there is an (explicit) acceptance of personal responsibility for a stated act which has been committed by the apologizer. The widely expressed cynicism with regard to political apologies which are made by major politicians long after the events concerned have occurred and for which they cannot be accountable reflects these cultural expectations, along with the clear sense that apologies are morally grounded.

#### It’s specifically sexist in this instance- Dianne Feinstein is the chair of the Senate intelligence committee

Jamieson, 13 -- Huffington Post

[Dave, "America Is 'Less Safe' Than 2 Years Ago, Intelligence Committee Chairs Say," Huffington Post, 12-1-13, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/01/dianne-feinstein-america-less-safe\_n\_4367906.html, accessed 2-18-14]

The lawmakers who lead the House and Senate intelligence committees both said on Sunday that they believe the United States is less safe from a terror attack than it was two years ago. Interviewed on CNN's "State of the Union," Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said she believed that there are now more terrorists with the technological means to carry out a bombing in the U.S. "I think terror is up worldwide," said Feinstein, who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee. "There are new bombs, very big bombs, trucks being reinforced for those bombs. There are bombs that go through magnetometers. The bomb-maker is still alive. There are more groups than ever. And there is huge malevolence out there."

#### Criticism of the their discourse must be evaluated before anything else in the round – rhetorical representations are key to the disposition of policymaking

Dauber 01 (Con Dauber, Assistant Professor of Communication Studies, University o f N o h Carolina, RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 2001, lexis)

The impact the Mogadishu images have had on American foreign policy is clear. But their impact is not inescapable or inevitable. It is based on the incorrect assumption that people can only read images unidirectionally. No matter how similar, no matter how powerful one text evokes another, every image is unique. Each comes from a different historical situation, is placed within a different story, and offers an ambiguous text that can be exploited by astute commentators. Images matter profoundly, but so do their contexts and the words that accompany them. The implications of this shift in interpretation are potentially profound. Mogadishu, or the mention of a potential parallel with Mogadishu, need not be a straightjacket or a deterrent to the use of American power. Rhetoric, whether discursive or visual, has real power in the way events play out. What this article makes clear is that rhetoric (and therefore rhetorical analysis) also has power in the way policy is shaped and defined. In a recent book on the conflict in Kosovo, the authors note that when the president spoke to the nation on the night the air war began, he immediately ruled out the use of ground forces. This was done, they argue, due to fears that leaving open the possibility of ground force participation would sacrifice domestic public and congressional (and allied) support for the air war. But “publicly ruling out their use only helped to reduce Milosevic’s uncertainty regarding the likely scope of NATO’s military actions,” and possibly to lengthened the air war as a result. Yet, they report, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, “who authored the critical passage in the President’s speech, maintains that ‘we would not have won the war without this sentence.”’ It would be difficult to find more direct evidence for the profound impact and influence public rhetoric and debate have and are understood to have - on policy, policymaking, and policymakers at the highest level. That means that rhetorical analysis can have a role to play and a voice at the table before policies are determined. Academic rhetoricians, through their choice of projects and the formats in which they publish, can stake a claim to having an important voice at the table - and they should do so.

#### Gendered language encourages gendered attitudes – multiple studies prove

Chew and Kelley-Chew 7, Professor of Law @ Pittsburgh and Kelley-Chew, Associate @ Health Evolution Partners, JD @ Stanford, 2007 (Pat, and Lauren. “SUBTLY SEXIST LANGUAGE,” Columbia Journal of Gender and the Law. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg. 643-709)

While our tendency is to take language literally and not to look for meaning beyond the apparent message, cultural and psycholinguists propose that language conveys much more than the literal message. Benjamin Lee Whorf is often credited with the original hypothesis that language is related to perception, analysis, and conduct. He proposed that the words one uses and hears shape how one "understands reality and behaves with respect to it."'' This Whorfian hypothesis of "linguistic relativity" has been explored and debated since its introduction in the 1950s. One contemporary interpretation is that"linguistic processes are pervasive in most fundamental domains of thought. That is, it appears that what we normally call 'thinking' is in fact a complex set of collaborations between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations and processes." Considerable contemporary research, for example, has considered how our use of particular ostensibly-innocuous language can shape the way we think about gender and can have sexist effects. Words, phrases, and expressions that unnecessarily differentiate between women and men, or exclude, trivialize, or diminish either gender, for instance, have been shown to be problematic. Studies indicate that (1) the use of male-gendered words when referring to both men and women (male-gendered generics), (2) hierarchic and separatist terms (such as man and wife), and (3) terms that influence women's self-esteem or identity (such as using girl to refer to a woman) are all examples of sexist language. Consistent with the Whorfian hypothesis, social scientistshave carefully and specifically considered how the use of male-gendered generics shapes our perceptions and is linked to gender-related attitudes.

The Writing Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, no date given (1997-2008 is date range, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/gender.html> )

English speakers and writers have traditionally been taught to use masculine nouns and pronouns in situations where the gender of their subject(s) is unclear or variable, or when a group to which they are referring contains members of both sexes. For example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence states that " . . . all men are created equal . . ." and most of us were taught in elementary school to understand the word "men" in that context includes both male and female Americans. In recent decades, however, as women have become increasingly involved in the public sphere of American life, writers have reconsidered the way they express gender identities and relationships. Because most English language readers no longer understand the word "man" to be synonymous with "people," writers today must think more carefully about the ways they express gender in order to convey their ideas clearly and accurately to their readers. Moreover, these issues are important for people concerned about issues of social inequality. There is a relationship between our language use and our social reality. If we "erase" women from language, that makes it easier to maintain gender inequality. As Professor Sherryl Kleinman (2000:6) has argued, [M]ale-based generics are another indicator—and, more importantly, a reinforcer—of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Words matter, and our language choices have consequences. If we believe that women and men deserve social equality, then we should think seriously about how to reflect that belief in our language use.

#### Changing gendered language is key to changing degradation and result in widespread social change.

Miller & Swift 88 , Freelance, nationally-published editors & reporters, Yale grads,’88 (Casey & Kate, A Handbook of Non-Sexist Language, p. 3, \*Note: “Casey” Miller is a womyn.)

What standard English usage says about males is that they are the species. What it says about females is that they are a subspecies. From these two assertions flow a thousand other enhancing and degrading messages, all encoded in the language we in the English-speaking countries begin to learn almost as soon as we are born. Many people would like to do something about these inherited linguistic biases, but getting rid of them involves more than exposing them and suggesting alternatives. It requires change, and linguistic change may be no easier to accept than any other kind. It may even be harder. At a deep level, changes in a language are threatening because they signal widespread changes in social mores.